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Since 1997, the U.S. government has attempted to use the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreement on telecommunications services as a vehicle for 
“exporting” American principles of telecommunications regulation to other nations. The 
United States took the position in 1997 that the WTO telecommunications agreement 
requires its signatory nations to follow the practices of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) on telecommunications regulatory policy. Subsequently, the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has sought to influence, under the implicit threat of 
trade sanctions, Japan’s domestic regulatory policy on the pricing of mandatory competitor 
access to the unbundled elements of the local network belonging to the operating 
companies of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT). In this Article, we 
examine the substantive difficulties of engrafting the FCC’s interconnection policy onto 
the telecommunications marketplace of another nation. For more than five years, many 
American experts on telecommunications policy have disagreed whether American 
consumers have benefited from the very FCC policies that the USTR would have Japanese 
regulators emulate. The USTR’s initiative appears to ignore that the transition to cost-
oriented rates for interconnection and retail telecommunications services has been a 
difficult and unfinished process in the United States; that the cost models used by the FCC 
to set interconnection prices have significant deficiencies; that actual interconnection prices 
both within and outside the United States diverge considerably from the estimates of the 
FCC’s cost models; that variations across countries in the prices of inputs have a significant 
effect on the costs of interconnection; and that, with respect to depreciation in particular, 
regulators treat this cost differently—and, from an economic perspective, more 
reasonably—in Japan than in the United States. Such substantive economic considerations 
suggest why the FCC’s policy in this area has generated continuous litigation, including 
two Supreme Court cases, since 1996 and consequently is too unresolved at this point in 
the American experience for the United States to force on its trading partners. Next, we ask 
whether the USTR has the detailed knowledge required to negotiate trade agreements on 
interconnection pricing. We question the propriety of using the USTR to influence the 
domestic regulatory policy of another country on a topic as complex as the efficient 
pricing of mandatory access to unbundled network elements. The USTR’s power t o 
formulate trade policy on this subject resides in officials who are unlikely to possess the 
economic expertise and resources necessary to evaluate the consumer-welfare 
implications of the policies that they would have Japan and other nations adopt. For these 
reasons, the USTR cannot credibly make the interconnection pricing policies of another 
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Exporting Telecommunications Regulation:  
The U.S.–Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing 
 
 





  On February 15, 1997, seventy countries working within the framework of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed on a multilateral reduction of regulatory 
barriers to competition in international telecommunications services.
1 At the time, the 
signatory nations to the WTO agreement on telecommunications services represented 
markets generating 95 percent of the $600 billion in global telecommunications 
revenues.
2
 Beginning January 1, 1998, those nations started a phased process to open 
their telecommunications markets to competition. Since 1997, the U.S. government has 
attempted to use the WTO agreement on telecommunications services as a vehicle for 
“exporting” American principles of telecommunications regulation to other nations. 
In Part II of this Article, we explain how the United States took the position in 
1997 that the WTO agreement on telecommunications services requires its signatory 
nations to follow the practices of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on 
interconnection pricing under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
3 That effort has 
culminated in the current initiative by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
                                                 
1.  World Trade Organization, The WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (Feb. 17, 1997) 
(unofficial briefing document). For an analysis of the WTO agreement, see J. G REGORY SIDAK, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 367-94 (University of Chicago Press 1997).  See also 
EDWARD M. GRAHAM & J. DAVID RICHARDSON, G LOBAL COMPETITION POLICY (Institute for International 
Economics 1999); John H. Harwood II, William T. Lake & David M Sohn, Competition in International 
Telecommunications Services, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 881-84 (1997). 
2. Edmund L. Andrews, In Global Push for Phone Deal, U.S. Is Odd Man Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at 
D1; Anne Swardson & Paul Blustein, WTO Reaches Phone Pact, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1997, at A33. 
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.      
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(USTR) to influence, under the implicit threat of trade sanctions, Japan’s domestic 
regulatory policy on the pricing of mandatory competitor access to the unbundled 
elements of the local network belonging to the operating companies of Nippon Telegraph 
and Telephone Corporation (NTT).  
In Part III, we examine the substantive difficulties of applying the FCC’s 
interconnection policies to Japan. It appears that the USTR is unaware that, for more than 
five years, many American experts on telecommunications policy have disagreed whether 
American consumers have benefited from the very FCC policies that USTR would have 
Japanese regulators emulate. It appears, moreover, that the USTR’s initiative ignores that 
the transition to cost-oriented rates for interconnection and retail telecommunications 
services has been a difficult and unfinished process in the United States; that the cost 
models used by the FCC to set interconnection prices have significant deficiencies; that 
actual interconnection prices both within and outside the United States diverge 
considerably from the estimates of the FCC’s cost models; that variations across 
countries in the prices of inputs have a significant effect on the costs of interconnection; 
and that regulators treat depreciation costs in particular differently—and, from an 
economic perspective, more reasonably—in Japan than in the United States. Such 
substantive economic considerations suggest why the FCC’s policy in this area has 
generated continuous litigation, including two Supreme Court cases, since 1996 and is 
too unresolved for the United States to force on its trading partners. 
In Part IV, we ask whether the USTR has the detailed knowledge and expertise 
and has the proper incentives to negotiate trade agreements on interconnection pricing. 
The public policy issues associated with telecommunications regulations are far more 
complex than those associated with industrial and agricultural products. We question the 
propriety of using the USTR to influence the domestic regulatory policy of another 
country on a topic as complex as the efficient pricing of mandatory access to unbundled 
network elements. The USTR’s power to formulate trade policy on this subject resides in 
officials who are unlikely to possess the economic expertise and resources necessary to 
evaluate the consumer-welfare implications of the policies that they would have Japan 
and other nations adopt.  
For these reasons, the USTR  cannot credibly make the interconnection pricing 
policies of another nation a legitimate concern of U.S. trade policy.      
 




II.  Did the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services Incorporate the 
FCC’s Interconnection Policy? 
 
When commenting on the applicability of the U.S. model of telecommunications 
liberalization to other nations, Robert Crandall wrote in June 1997 that “[t]he most 
contentious single issue in implementing the 1996 Telecommunications Act in the United 
States is the measure of cost to be used in setting rates for wholesale unbundled network 
elements.”
4 Despite that economic assessment in 1997, and despite its confirmation over 
the following four years, interconnection pricing is today the very aspect of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that the USTR aggressively seeks to impose on other 
nations in the name of enforcing the WTO agreement on telecommunications services. 
A. TELRIC Pricing Under the FCC’s First Report and Order on Interconnection 
To promote competition in the provision of local telecommunications services in 
the United States, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which 
provides for three different forms of competitive entry in local exchange markets: (1) 
facilities-based entry; (2) resale of the services of the incumbent local exchange provider 
(ILEC); or (3) leasing of unbundled network elements (UNEs) by the ILEC to 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). With respect to the pricing of UNEs, the 
1996 legislation requires that prices be “based on the cost” of providing the network 
element.
5 Two issues immediately arise. First, which elements should an ILEC have the 
legal duty to unbundle—that is, to offer for sale on a disaggregated basis—at regulated, 
cost-based rates to CLECs, so that they can produce their own services? Second, how should 
mandatory access to the ILEC’s unbundled local loops be priced? Despite the importance of 
the first question, we address here only the second question, because it is the focus of the 
USTR’s negotiations with Japan.
6 
                                                 
4. Robert W. Crandall,  Telecommunications Liberalization: The U.S. Model, in  DEREGULATION AND 
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE  ASIA-PACIFIC  REGION  415, 428 ( Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger, eds., 
University of Chicago Press 2000) (paper presented at conference, June 19-21, 1997). See also MARTIN 
CAVE  & R OBERT  W. C RANDALL, T ELECOMMUNICATIONS  LIBERALIZATION ON  TWO  SIDES OF THE 
ATLANTIC (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2001). 
5. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(A)(i). 
6. The first question is analyzed in detail from an economic perspective in Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory 
Sidak,  A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 
109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999).      
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In its First Report and Order on local interconnection, issued in August 1996, the 
FCC introduced the concept of total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) to set 
UNE prices.
7 Because LRIC only considers incremental costs of a long-run nature, the 
total UNE price is the sum of the forward-looking long-run incremental cost of an 
efficient network and a reasonable
8 portion of forward-looking common costs.
9 Analysis 
based on historical costs, a second cost-based approach, can serve as a validation check 
on proposed TELRIC estimates.  
TELRIC pricing has been controversial in the United States. The FCC’s 
interconnection policies in general, and its TELRIC methodology in particular, have 
many economic shortcomings.
10 The TELRIC methodology excludes incumbent firms’ 
shared and common costs, discourages facilities-based investments, and effectively 
                                                 
7. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First 
Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98, 95-185, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 15,499 (1996) [hereinafter First Report and 
Order], rev’d in part and aff’d in part, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part 
and aff’d in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), rev’d on remand sub nom. 
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications, 
Inc. v. FCC, 121 S. Ct. 877 (2001). TELRIC pricing is codified in the FCC’s rules at 47 C.F.R. § 51.501 et 
seq. For a critique of the  First Report and Order, see  J. G REGORY  SIDAK  & D ANIEL  F. S PULBER, 
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT : T HE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF 
NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. 
Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97  COLUM. L. R EV. 1081 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak &. Spulber, 
Tragedy of the Telecommons].  
8. In the First Report and Order, the FCC suggested that one “reasonable” cost allocation method “would 
be to allocate common costs using a fixed allocator, such as a percentage markup over the directly 
attributable forward-looking costs.” First Report and Order, supra note  7, at 15,853 ¶ 696. For example, 
the Illinois Commerce Commission ordered GTE and Ameritech to offer unbundled network elements at 
TELRIC plus 28.86 percent. See Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. Order, at 46, 
available at 2000 WL 562306 (Ill. Comm. Comm’n Mar. 29, 2000). The California Public Utilities 
Commission ordered Pacific Bell to offer its UNEs at TELRIC plus 19 percent.  See Governing Open 
Access to Bottleneck Services, 197 P.U.R.4th 369 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Nov. 18, 1999). 
9. There is continuing debate in the United States as to whether the incumbent provider should be required 
to base its costs on a hypothetical network that is “superior” to its own or, alternatively, on its actual 
forward-looking costs of providing the network element. For a comprehensive review of that debate, see 
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7; DALE E. L EHMAN & DENNIS L. WEISMAN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ACT OF 1996: THE “COSTS” OF MANAGED COMPETITION (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000); ALFRED E. 
KAHN, L ETTING  GO: D EREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION (1998); ALFRED E. KAHN, WHOM 
THE GODS  WOULD  DESTROY, OR  HOW NOT TO DEREGULATE (AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulatory 
Reform 2001). 
10. One of us has criticized the FCC’s version of TELRIC pricing at length. See Hausman & Sidak, supra 
note 6; Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000); Sidak &. Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 7; J. Gregory Sidak 
& Daniel F. Spulber,  Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72  N.Y.U. L. R EV. 
1068 (1997).      
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subsidizes inefficient competition by granting a CLEC a free option on sunk investments 
that are subject to technological uncertainty.
11 
There is no reason why TELRIC should always be less than embedded costs. For 
example, TELRIC may exceed embedded costs if loops must be placed underground in 
the future (as required in many U.S. locations).
12 Two factors that can cause TELRIC and 
embedded costs estimates to diverge are (1) changes in investment costs (decreasing 
investment costs can cause embedded costs to exceed TELRIC), and (2) changes in 
depreciation schedules (protracted regulatory depreciation periods can cause embedded 
costs to exceed TELRIC).
13  
In 1996, the FCC relied upon proxies based largely on HAI model estimates to 
provide pricing guidance to the state public utilities commissions (PUCs) for interim 
UNE rates. While the FCC’s pricing guidelines were stayed by the Eighth Circuit,
14 
PUCs relied upon various models including the HAI, BCPM and internal ILEC models to 
produce forward-looking costs. The PUCs often set higher rates that were closer to 
embedded costs than those recommended by the FCC. Several years later, the FCC 
developed its own hybrid cost proxy model (HCPM) for purposes of universal service. 
The HCPM was the result of FCC objectives to combine the “best” features of the HAI 
and BCPM models as well as address the flaws that many critics saw in those models. 
HCPM forward-looking cost estimates are generally much higher than the FCC’s original 
proxy costs and are often closer to embedded costs than the rates set by state PUCs.
15 The 
FCC’s proxy rates for unbundled loops are presented in Table 1 below and can be 




                                                 
11. Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 7, at 1107-10. Alternatively, one of us has 
advocated the combination of the market-determined efficient component-pricing rule (M-ECPR) with a 
system of competitively neutral end-user charges. Such a system would establish a cost-based pricing 
environment that compensates incumbents and creates present and future incentives for efficient 
competitive entry. Id. at 1093 et seq. 
12. LEHMAN & WEISMAN, supra note 9, at 65.  
13. Id. at 70; see also SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 200; text accompanying notes 71-76 infra. 
14. Iowa Utilites Board, et al, Petitioners v. Federal Communications Commission; United States of 
America, Respondents, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (October 16, 1996). 
15. LEHMAN & WEISMAN, supra note  9, at 78. Lehman and Weisman estimated that the mean difference 
between HCPM and embedded costs was 0.07 percent.      
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TABLE 1: STATE PROXY CEILINGS FOR LOCAL LOOP ($ US) 
State  Proxy Ceiling   State  Proxy Ceiling 
Alabama  17.25    Montana  25.18 
Arizona  12.85    Nebraska  18.05 
Arkansas  21.18    Nevada  18.95 
California  11.10    New Hampshire 16.00 
Colorado  14.97    New Jersey  12.47 
Connecticut  13.23    New Mexico  18.66 
Delaware  13.24    New York  11.75 
District of 
Columbia 
10.81    North Carolina  16.71 
Florida  13.68    North Dakota  25.36 
Georgia  16.09    Ohio  15.73 
Hawaii  15.27    Oklahoma  17.63 
Idaho  20.16    Oregon  15.44 
Illinois  13.12    Pennsylvania  12.30 
Indiana  13.29    Puerto Rico  12.47 
Iowa  15.94    Rhode Island  11.48 
Kansas  19.85    South Carolina  17.07 
Kentucky  16.70    South Dakota  25.33 
Louisiana  16.98    Tennessee  17.41 
Maine  18.69    Texas  15.49 
Maryland  13.36    Utah  15.12 
Massachusetts 9.83    Vermont  20.13 
Michigan  15.27    Virginia  14.13 
Minnesota  14.81    Washington  13.37 
Mississippi  21.97    West Virginia  19.25 
Missouri  18.32    Wisconsin  15.94 
      Wyoming  25.11 
Source: AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Appendix D. 
 
Even within individual states, prices for unbundled loops appear to vary in 
accordance with local changes in underlying costs. For example, population dispersion 
and geographical conditions vary greatly across regions. The sharp contrast between 
densely populated areas and remote areas necessitates different network architectures and 
hence different costs in different parts of an ILEC’s access network. The notion that 
access prices should conform to local circumstances is well documented in U.S. 
regulatory history. In the First Report and Order, the FCC empowered state PUCs to      
 




16 UNE rates to meet the 1996 Act’s mandate that 
rates for interconnection and unbundled elements be “based on the cost . . . of providing 
the i nterconnection of network elements.”
17 After surveying the state PUCs’ different 
costing methods for geographically deaveraged “zones,” the FCC concluded that “three 
zones are presumptively sufficient to reflect geographic cost differences in setting rates 
for interconnection and unbundled elements, and that states may, but need not, use these 
existing density-related rate zones.”
18 
The FCC recognized that UNE costs must be assessed in light of states’ varying 
population densities and geographical conditions. Most American states have established 
three density-based zones for access pricing.
19 Table 2 shows the deaveraged monthly 
unbundled loop rates established by the state PUCs in the United States, according to a 
report released in 2001 by the National Regulatory Research Institute, an organization 
created and supported by all of the independent public utility regulators in the United 
States.  
TABLE 2: MONTHLY UNBUNDLED LOOP RATES, 2001 ($ US) 
State  Zone 1  Zone 2  Zone 3  Zone 4  Average 
Alabama  15.24  24.75  44.85    19.04 
Arkansas  18.75  31.60  71.05     
Arizona  21.98         
California  10.03  13.51  25.53     
Colorado  19.65  26.65  38.65  84.65   
Connecticut  8.95  12.03  13.28  19.69  12.49 
District of 
Columbia  10.81         
Delaware  10.07  13.13  16.67    12.05 
Florida  13.76  20.13  44.40     
Georgia  14.21  16.41  26.08    16.51 
Idaho  25.52         
Illinois  2.59  7.07  11.40  11.40  9.81 
Indiana  8.03  8.15  8.99    8.20 
Iowa  20.15        20.15 
Kansas  11.86  13.64  23.34    14.04 
Kentucky  17.44  22.23  25.84    19.65/20.00 
Louisiana  19.35  22.84       
                                                 
16. First Report and Order, supra note 7, ¶ 764.  
17. 47 U.S.C. 252(d)(1)(a)(i). 
18. First Report and Order, supra note 7, ¶ 765.  
19. Eleven states have created four zones, and one state created five.      
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Maine  12.67  15.59  23.00    17.53 
Massachusetts  7.54  14.11  16.12  20.04  14.98 
Maryland  12.11  12.85  18.40  25.96  14.50 
Michigan  8.47  8.73  12.54    10.15 
Minnesota  8.81  12.33  14.48  21.91  17.87 
Missouri  12.71  20.71  33.29  18.23   
Mississippi  16.71  21.45  29.75  38.59   
Montana  26.69  27.62  31.36  33.95  27.41 
North Carolina  16.71         
North Dakota  16.41  27.66  62.66     
Nebraska  13.56  27.12  54.24    14.32 
Nevada  11.75  22.66  66.31    19.83 
New Hampshire  14.01  15.87  24.09    17.99 
New Jersey  11.95  16.02  20.98    16.17 
New Mexico  17.75  20.30  26.23     
New York  11.83  12.49  19.24    14.81 
Ohio  5.93  7.97  9.52     
Oklahoma   12.14  13.65  26.25    14.84 
Oregon  13.95  25.20  56.21    15.00 
Pennsylvania  10.25  11.00  14.00  17.50  14.06 
Rhode Island  12.05  16.62  20.59     
South Carolina  18.48  27.87  36.91     
South Dakota  7.01  18.54  24.37     
Tennessee  13.19  17.23  22.53    14.92 
Texas  12.14  13.65  18.98    14.15 
Utah  14.41  17.47  24.14    20.00 
Virginia  10.74  16.45  29.40    13.597 
Vermont  7.72  8.35  21.63    14.41 
Washington  7.91  14.13  15.90  17.85  11.33 
Wisconsin  10.90         
West Virginia  14.99  22.04  43.44    24.58 
Wyoming  19.05  31.83  40.11  58.43   
Average ($)  13.49  17.97  29.25  33.16   
Source: BILLY  JACK GREGG, A SURVEY OF UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENT PRICES IN 
THE  UNITED STATES, Table 1 (National Regulatory Research Institute Working Paper) 
(Spring 2001).  
 
As Table 2 shows, the average monthly price for an unbundled loop in areas with 
comparatively high population densities (zone 1) was $13.49. The average monthly 
access price for zone 2 regions was $17.97. The average access price for the least densely 
populated regions (zone 3) was $29.25.      
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B. The WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services 
  The 1997 WTO agreement on telecommunications services covers market access, 
foreign investment, and “procompetitive regulatory principles.” The WTO outlined the last 
of those topics in its April 1996 Reference Paper, which requires signatory nations to 
guarantee, among other things, that foreign carriers be allowed to interconnect with 
domestic networks at prices that do not result in anticompetitive cross-subsidization.
20
 
Beyond that, however, the Reference Paper is general and undetailed—perhaps necessarily 
so, because the policies are intended to apply to a highly diverse set of countries. In any 
event, the Reference Paper has turned out to be malleable into any policy outcome that 
imaginative regulators can reconcile with the document’s unobjectionable desiderata.
21
 In 
particular, Chairman Reed E. Hundt of the FCC portrayed the nearly unanimous acceptance 
of the Reference Paper at the 1997 Geneva accord as tantamount to a global endorsement 
of American regulatory policies embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996:  
 
By this agreement, the Telecommunications Act enacted a year ago by Congress 
has become the world’s gold standard for pro-competitive deregulation. Sixty-five 
countries have bound themselves to the Reference Paper embodying the 
Congressional vision of free competition, fair rules, and effective enforcement. 
 
  In Buenos Aires three years ago, at the first International Telecommunications 
Union development conference, Vice President Gore challenged the nations of the 
world to build a network around the globe linking all human knowledge and creating 
global opportunities. One year ago, Congress delivered a clear and compelling blueprint 




  Moreover, American officials indicated that this “blueprint” for competition did not 
entail a deregulatory process. In the week following completion of the WTO agreement in 
1997, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Jeffrey Lang, commenting to a Washington, D.C., 
                                                 
20. World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper (Apr. 24, 
1996) [hereinafter Reference Paper]. This document is reprinted in SIDAK, supra note 1, at 397-99. 
21. See, e.g., CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 56-58 (AEI Press 2001).      
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audience on the principles contained in the Reference Paper, observed that “to move from 
what was regarded for 100 years as not just a monopoly but a natural monopoly . . . to a 
system of enforced competition means not deregulation but reregulation. And that is what 
the pro-competitive principles embody.”
23
 Curiously, American officials saw reregulation 
as essential to the promotion of competition. 
  At the same event Chairman Hundt said that, just as “the laws of physics are 
everywhere the same, . . . it may well be that the laws of economics can be demonstrated to 
everywhere be the same,” such that there would be no need to have “different ways to 
resolve issues such as forward-looking pricing.”
24 It is true that microeconomic principles 
are the same everywhere, but that maxim applies to both correct and faulty economics. The 
danger inherent in Chairman Hundt’s view is that if the FCC’s reliance on faulty 
economics produces misguided policies, then the gloss that the FCC placed on the WTO’s 
Reference Paper would force on other nations a set of practices predicated on fallacious 
economic reasoning, practices that consequently would degrade the efficient operation of 
their telecommunications systems and harm their consumers.  
  Contrary to the announced position of Chairman Hundt in 1997, it strains 
credulity past the breaking point to suppose that the nations that signed the WTO 
agreement on telecommunications services thought that in so doing they had delegated to 
the FCC the power to set their domestic policies on the economic method by which the 
price shall be determined for the lease of an incumbent carrier’s unbundled loop to a 
competitor. It would be arrogant for the trade policy of any nation to be predicated on the 
supposition that the 1997 WTO agreement, incorporating as it did the procompetitive 
platitudes of the 1996 Reference Paper, codified the regulatory practice of any one 
signatory nation. Yet, as we next explain, the Trade Representative has approached the 
U.S.-Japan negotiations on interconnection pricing as if that supposition were correct. 
C. USTR’s Negotiations with Japan over Interconnection Pricing 
As the dominant telecommunications service provider and largest purchaser of 
telecommunications equipment in Japan, NTT has been at the center of these negotiations 
                                                                                                                                                 
22. Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt Concerning WTO Agreement on Telecom Services, Feb. 15, 
1997 (released Feb. 18, 1997). 
23. Remarks by Jeffrey Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, to the Center for Strategy and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 21, 1997) (emphasis added).      
 
   11
 
 
on issues ranging from procuring U.S. telecommunications equipment to the 
establishment of network interconnection rates. 
 1.Privatization, Deregulation, and Restructuring in the Japanese 
Telecommunications Market 
The Japanese government traditionally maintained strict control over the country’s 
telecommunications industry. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation was 
organized in 1952. Until 1985, NTT was part of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommuni-
cations (MPT). In 1985, the Japanese government began privatizing and liberalizing all 
sectors of its telecommunications industry. The Japanese Diet passed the Nippon Denshin 
Denwa Kabushiki Kaisha Law (the NTT law). Pursuant to that law, Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation was incorporated as an ordinary business corporation, and Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation was dissolved. Also pursuant to the NTT Law, 
the MPT began to privatize NTT in 1986. Shares were sold in three domestic public 
offerings; the second and third offerings were held in 1987 and 1988. Through those three 
offerings, the Japanese government sold 34.37 percent of NTT, raising more than $12 
billion.
25 At the end of 2001, government ownership was 46 percent. 
The Telecommunications Business Law, also passed in 1985, liberalized the 
telecommunications services sector in Japan. The law ended NTT’s monopoly status as the 
provider of local and domestic long-distance telephony service and the monopoly status of 
privately owned Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD) as the sole provider of international long-
distance service. The law differentiates between resellers  of value-added services 
(designated as Type II operators), which need only register with the MPT, and facilities-
based operators (designated as Type I operators), which must obtain a license from the 
MPT.
26 
In June 1997, the Japanese Diet amended the NTT Law to accommodate a plan of 
reorganization for NTT that the MPT proposed and NTT had accepted in principle.
27 
Once the reorganization took effect on July 1, 1999, NTT became a holding company 
with three wholly owned subsidiaries: NTT East, NTT West, and NTT 
                                                                                                                                                 
24. Id. (comments of Reed E. Hundt). 
 25. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, WORLD TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT 56 (1994) 
[hereinafter ITU WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT ]. 
 26.  Id. at 61; INFOCOM RESEARCH, INC., INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS IN JAPAN 2001, at 22-23 (2001). 
 27.  NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 13 (for the year ended 
Mar. 31, 2001).      
 




28 NTT East and NTT West are both regional fixed-line operators 
analogous to a regional Bell operating company (RBOC) in the United States. The two 
NTT companies may not engage in long-distance telecommunications, just as an RBOC 
may not do s o without prior regulatory authorization. The operations of NTT 
Communications include a wireless company, NTT DoCoMo. Also in June 1997, the 
Japanese Diet revised the Telecommunications Business Law to promote transparent, 
fair, prompt, and reasonable interconnection.
29 
2. USTR’s Advocacy of TELRIC Pricing 
In 1997, the United States and Japan began the Enhanced Initiative on 
Deregulation and Competition Policy, which addresses market access for various good 
and services, including telecommunications services. From 1999 through March 2000, 
the U.S. and Japanese governments held unsuccessful negotiations concerning the 
adoption of a long-run incremental cost (LRIC) methodology for calculating the 
interconnection prices that NTT may charge its competitors in Japan.
30 In July 2000, 
however, the U.S. and Japanese governments were able to agree, in the Third Joint Status 
Report on the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy, 
upon a series of steps that would reduce the cost and procedures of access to NTT’s 
network and facilities.
31 Further, there was agreement that the Japanese government 
would take steps to establish a more independent regulatory structure.
32 Finally, NTT 
announced significant cost reductions in interconnection rates, which both governments 
acknowledged and welcomed.
33 These steps were applauded by several U.S. long-
distance companies that provide international services, such as AT&T and MCI 
WorldCom. On June 30, 2001, Japan and the United States issued their Fourth Joint 
Status Report, which reaffirmed both countries’ determination to promote further 
deregulation. 
More specifically, the Third Joint Status Report addressed, among other issues, 
four topics. First, it reduced certain interconnection rates at the backbone (tandem) and 
                                                 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.      
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local level. Second, it provided for easier access to NTT’s facilities by competitors. 
Third, it secured Japan’s commitment to establish a more independent 
telecommunications regulatory structure. Fourth, it addressed the expansion of Internet-
related competition. Of these four issues, the one having the largest financial influence is 
the rate that NTT East, NTT West, and DoCoMo may charge competitors to link into and 
use some portions of NTT’s networks. Small variations in interconnection rates have 
dramatic financial results on NTT.
34  
In the U.S.-Japan negotiations, the central issue surrounding interconnection rates 
is the economic cost model that NTT will be allowed to use to establish those rates. 
Several models are available, and different ones are used in different countries. But the 
USTR has urged the Japanese government, through the MPT, to require NTT to use the 
so-called “bottom-up” long-run incremental cost model. NTT prefers to use the widely 
accepted alternative “top-down” LRIC model (with certain adjustments unique to the 
Japanese market).
35
 The negotiations over the choice of a cost model could not be 
finalized in the July 2000 agreement, with the result that the USTR reached a political 
arrangement with the Prime Minister’s office to r educe on an interim basis certain 
interconnection rates without using  any specific model as a basis. However, the two 
governments agreed to review the competing interconnection models at the end of 2002, 
with the hope of selecting a model at that time. 
Further, the July 2000 steps called for periodic reviews by both the U.S. and 
Japanese governments of other outstanding issues, such as unbundling of the local loop, 
                                                 
 34.   Id. NTT reported that the price reductions had, and were expected to have, significant effects on its 
revenues: 
 
As a result of the agreement reached between the [Japanese] Government and the U.S. 
Government, it is estimated that fiscal 2001 revenues of NTT East and NTT West were reduced by 
approximately ¥52 billion (representing a decrease in revenues of ¥26 billion for each of NTT East 
and NTT West; fiscal 2002 revenues of NTT East and NTT West would be reduced by 
approximately ¥89 billion representing a decrease in revenues of ¥45 billion for NTT East and a 
decrease in revenues of ¥44 billion for NTT West); and fiscal 2003 revenues of NTT East and 
NTT West would be reduced by approximately ¥107 billion (representing a decrease in revenues 
of ¥55 billion for NTT East and a decrease in revenues of ¥52 billion for NTT West). For these 
three fiscal years, the decrease in revenues of NTT East and NTT West is expected to be ¥248 
billion (representing a decrease in revenues of ¥126 billion for NTT East and a decrease in 
revenues of ¥122 billion for NTT West). 
 
Id. at 14. 
35. In July 2001, MPT became part of the new Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and 
Telecommunications. See INFOCOM RESEARCH, INC., supra note 26, at 22 n.*.      
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access to NTT’s facilities, and so forth. A schedule for a review of these other issues was 
not established, but USTR intends to review them at least annually in the context of the 
so-called section 1377 finding that the Trade Representative makes the end of March 
each year.
36
 An adverse section 1377 finding can result in trade sanctions and must be 
taken seriously. 
 
III.  The Substantive Challenges of Applying the FCC’s Interconnection Pricing 
Policies to Japan 
 
It is possible that Chairman Hundt did not literally mean in 1997 that the U.S. 
government considered the signatories to the WTO agreement on telecommunications 
services obliged to adopt the reasoning of the FCC’s First Report and Order, issued in 
August 1996. Perhaps he was expressing an aspiration. But, if so, it was more than 
merely hortatory, since the USTR in time could make that same aspiration the goal of 
U.S. trade negotiations with other nations, which could be pursued using the leverage 
from the implicit threat of trade sanctions.  
This second interpretation is consistent with the manner in which Chairman 
Hundt imposed the FCC’s TELRIC model of interconnection pricing on American ILECs 
even after key provisions of First Report and Order had been vacated by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and a further appeal was pending (for the first time) in 
the Supreme Court.
37
 During that hiatus, the FCC attempted to impose its TELRIC model 
on ILECs by requiring “voluntary” acceptance of the model by ILECs that had mergers 
pending before the FCC.
38
 In other words, the possibility that its actions might be 
                                                 
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1377. 
37. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part and aff’d in part sub nom. AT&T 
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). Of course, in one sense it is not obvious what “U.S.” policy 
concerning TELRIC pricing really is: Technically, the state public utilities commissions set the rates for an 
unbundled network elements, and those rates vary from one state to another, as Table 1 indicates. This 
consideration suggests that issues of federal preemption may be present, but that is a topic that we do not 
address here. 
38. See Application of GTE Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corp., Transferee; For Consent to Transfer 
Control of Domestic and International Sections 214 and 310 Authorizations and Application to Transfer 
Control of a Submarine Cable Landing License, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Dkt. No. 98-184, 15 
F.C.C. Rcd. 14,032 ¶ 277 (2000); Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications, 
Inc., Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines 
Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95, and 
101 of the Commission's Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Dkt. No. 98-141, 14 F.C.C. Rcd. 
14,712, 14,854-925 ¶¶ 348-518 (1999) (discussing conditions); App. C, Conditions, id. at 14,964-15,172.      
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unlawful under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not stop the FCC from trying to 
impose its TELRIC pricing model through its exercise of statutory powers that were 
totally unrelated to network interconnection and unbundling. 
As we shall explain in Part IV, the USTR has considerably greater latitude in 
defining its agenda than does the FCC. Assuming for the sake of argument that it would 
in some sense be advantageous to the United States for the USTR to persuade or cajole 
Japan to adopt the FCC’s current model of TELRIC pricing, what substantive economic 
questions would such a trade policy need to address? To this question we now turn. 
A.  The Difficult Transition to Cost-Oriented Rates for Interconnection and Retail 
Telecommunications Services 
Before the introduction of competition, telecommunications prices have typically 
embodied large cross-subsidies that reflect public policy preferences.
39 In particular, 
access to the network for residential customers has generally been priced below cost. The 
preponderance of network costs have been recovered through high usage rates for 
domestic and international long-distance calling. The economic rationale for this 
regulatory policy was to promote universal service—and thereby to harness the positive 
network externalities, or “bandwagon effects,” from increasing the reach of the 
telecommunications network.
40
 This pattern prevailed in Japan, the United States and 
many other industrialized countries. 
When competition is introduced, retail rates should ultimately be rebalanced to 
reflect costs. Subsidy schemes that existed before competition are inherently 
unsustainable under competition. Experience has shown that ways can always be found to 
bypass any subsidy scheme. Furthermore, subsidies in the future will be vulnerable to 
bypass via voice-over-Internet protocols (VoIP). 
Nevertheless, no country has made a very rapid transition to cost-oriented 
telecommunications rates. Large increases in local telecommunications prices (to bring 
them to cost-oriented levels) are politically unpopular. Public policy  makers have 
                                                                                                                                                 
For a critical view of the imposition of such conditions in merger approvals at the FCC, see Harold 
Furchtgott-Roth, The FCC Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999. 
39. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE? WHEN 
TELEPHONE  SUBSIDIES  BECOME  TRANSPARENT  166 (Brookings Institution 2000) (discussing regulatory 
requirements to price local exchange service below cost).  
40. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 177-79 (MIT 
Press 2001).      
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uniformly insisted on lengthy transition periods to limit the pace at which rates are 
rebalanced.  
After the AT&T divestiture in the United States on January 1, 1984, Congress 
essentially vetoed the FCC’s attempts to complete the transition to cost-oriented rates in 
as few as eight years.
41 Although the FCC has continued to make progress, the transition 
is still not complete after 17 years. The transition is even farther from completion in 
many state jurisdictions, as we explain below in our examination of U.S. practices 
concerning interconnection prices. 
During the transition, interconnectors to the incumbent network pay 
interconnection charges that include a mark-up designed to provide a contribution toward 
the fixed costs of network access lines and to help defray the costs of providing local 
telecommunications service. In many countries, including the United States, 
interconnection rates are additionally supplemented by universal service charges. These 
charges contribute toward the costs of serving geographic areas with high costs or low-
income or handicapped individuals. Prices of rural telephone service often do not cover 
its high cost. Instead, urban customers are called upon to subsidize rural customers. 
Initially, the FCC developed a system of access charges that AT&T and other 
long-distance carriers paid to local telephone companies for origination and termination 
of long-distance calls. These charges included a carrier common line charge (CCLC) that 
covered part of the cost of the local loop.
42
 The FCC also developed a universal service 
fund supported by payments made to local telephone companies by each long-distance 
carrier based on the number of pre-subscribed lines. A number of mechanisms were also 
developed by which larger, lower-cost local telephone companies made contributions at 
one time to a fund that was distributed to rural, higher-cost companies.  
In the early 1990s, competitive access providers arrived on the scene demanding 
“unbundled” connections to the local telephone networks. The FCC responded by 
                                                 
41. For an economic analysis of the AT&T divestiture and its aftermath, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER 
THE  BREAKUP: T HE  U.S. T ELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR IN A  MORE  COMPETITIVE  ERA  (Brookings 
Institution 1991). For a complementary legal analysis, see MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, JOHN THORNE & PETER 
W. HUBER, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (Little, Brown 1992). 
42. See, e.g., KELLOGG, THORNE & HUBER, supra note 41, at 469-70.      
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restructuring transport rates to include a non-cost-oriented residual interconnection 
charge (RIC) that all interconnecting parties had to pay on a per-minute basis.
43
  
As late as 1999, the FCC delayed implementation of full rate rebalancing in the 
CALLS proposal.
44
 Fifteen years after the AT&T divestiture, the FCC was still concerned 
about too rapid a transition to cost-oriented rates. 
Pricing mechanisms have been continually revised as the FCC has gradually 
moved toward more-efficient interconnection price structures and has reduced the 
implicit subsidies contained in access charges. All interstate telecommunications carriers, 
not just long-distance companies, are now required to pay a percentage of their revenues 
to the new federal universal service fund.
45
 States have developed similar plans to recover 
fixed network costs, although access charges tend to be higher in the state jurisdictions, 
leaving more rate restructuring still to be accomplished. Additionally, a number of state 
regulators have retained the CCLC that the FCC sought to phase out in its rate 
rebalancing efforts.
46 Despite the many years that have passed, the United States has still 
not completed the rebalancing of its rates.  
In most other countries, there is no distinction between domestic local and long-
distance networks and no divided regulatory jurisdiction. Interconnection to incumbent 
networks is therefore a simpler matter. Rates are generally predicated not on the nature of 
the traffic, but on the technical configuration of interconnection sought.  
In this context, the United Kingdom first employed “access deficit charges” 
(ADCs) as a non-cost-oriented mark-up to interconnection rates.
47
 Since then, a number 
of other countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and several others, have 
                                                 
43. See Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers; Low-Volume 
Long Distance Users; Federal-State Joint Board On Universal Service, Sixth Report and Order, etc., CC 
Dkt. Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 99-249, 96-45, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 12,962 (2000). 
44. See id. 
45. 47 U.S.C. § 254. See also Kline & Co. v. MCI Communications Corp, 98 F. Supp. 2d 69, 70 (D. Mass. 
2000). 
46. The CCLC, as well as many other intrastate rates, vary by state because rates are set according to each 
carrier’s costs in that state. Interstate rates will vary by company, unless the FCC requires a specific price, 
such as the $3.50 cap on residential interstate line rates. 
47.  See, e.g.,  INGO  VOGELSANG & B RIDGER  M. MITCHELL, T ELECOMMUNICATIONS  COMPETITION: T HE 
LAST TEN MILES 278-80, 287, 289-91 (MIT Press & AEI Press 1997).      
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instituted explicit ADCs for this purpose.
48 ADCs are employed in addition to universal 
service programs.  
More generally, mark-ups above cost-oriented interconnection charges can 
provide a clear and nondiscriminatory mechanism f or recovery of fixed network costs 
during the transition period while rates are being rebalanced.
49
 Such mark-ups prevent 
arbitrage by end users seeking to avoid paying a share of the fixed network costs by 
switching carriers for long-distance and international services. A uniformly applied ADC 
does not bias the selection of one carrier over another. It allows long-distance and 
international competitors to compete with the incumbent on a level playing field. 
Competitive success then depends on offering high-quality long-distance and 
international services at low cost (apart from the non-discriminatory mark-up). It does not 
depend on the discriminatory arbitrage opportunities that would exist with unbalanced 
rates, absent such a mark-up. 
In Japan regulators have yet to adopt explicit mark-ups (for example, ADCs) 
above cost-oriented interconnection rates. Japan’s universal service program is still in 
developmental stages. Such measures, if adopted, would ease Japan’s transition to a fully 
rebalanced rate structure. Without such measures, Japan would be called upon to 
complete in a few years what the United States has failed to complete in more than 
seventeen years. The USTR can insist, upon threat of trade sanctions, that Japan make 
this transition immediately, but truculence in the name of free trade carries no assurance 
that it will accomplish what U.S. policy makers have been unable to do at home. 
B. The Deficiencies of Bottom-Up Cost Models 
To implement a regime of interconnection prices that are based on the forward-
looking long-run incremental cost of particular network elements, regulators must first 
produce reliable estimates of LRIC. Regulators sometimes use so-called “bottom-up” 
models for this purpose, but such models have serious problems. 
                                                 
48.  See  MARCO GATTI, J AN DAWSON & S OO AH RAN CHOA, B ENCHMARK COMPARISONS  Q1/Q4, 2001 
(Ovum 2001); INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS  UNION, S EMINAR ON REGULATORY AND TARIFF 
ISSUES FOR THE  CARIBBEAN  COUNTRIES (Montego Bay, Jamaica, July 4 -7, 2000);  INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  UNION, T RENDS IN  TELECOMMUNICATION  REFORM  (CONVERGENCE AND 
REGULATION) 84-86 (1999).  
49. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 9, at 334-35, 376-78, 388-91.      
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It is inappropriate to rely exclusively on so-called bottom-up models to generate 
regulatory estimates of incremental cost. Bottom-up models have serious deficiencies that 
skew cost estimates downward and yield unrealistic cost projections. Forward-looking 
top-down models, based on actual experience, are a superior alternative. Top-down 
models do, however, tend to overstate what costs should be (versus what they have been) 
unless specific adjustments are made. The best analytical approach of all may be to use 
both top-down and bottom-up models and reconcile the results.  
Cost models can help regulators set appropriate prices for network 
interconnection and develop appropriate methods for effective support of universal 
service. Either top-down or bottom-up cost models may be used for this purpose. Top-
down models rely on actual operating data, including expenses and investment account 
balances, to estimate forward-looking economic costs of operating and maintaining the 
network. Bottom-up models rely on simple engineering models of hypothetical networks 
to estimate costs. In theory, if there were perfect information and no strategic behavior 
(by the ILEC or the regulator), the bottom-up estimate of the long-run incremental cost of 
a network element would be the same as the top-down estimate. In actuality, of course, 
information is not perfect and strategic behavior is present in the regulatory process. 
Thus, bottom-up estimates of cost will diverge from top-down estimates.
50
 
Bottom-up models provide estimates of what the costs of an efficient firm would 
be. The exercise entails “educated guesses” about a network design using the most 
modern technology and hindsight as to factors such as demand, population growth, 
                                                 
50. This real-world divergence between bottom-up and top-down cost models motivates the CLECs’ 
strategy of requesting “recombination” of unbundled network elements to create a substitute to wholesale 
provision of the ILEC’s total service. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 335-37, 561-63. This 
divergence creates an opportunity for arbitrage: 
 
The fact that the entrant seeks to establish its right to recombine network elements indicates that the 
entrant expects that the prices for those elements necessary to provide basic service—the loop and 
port—will recover a lesser amount of common costs than will the wholesale price of basic service. In 
other words, the entrant’s demand to recombine elements signals the entrant’s belief (1) that the 
incumbent LEC’s forward-looking common costs are not de minimis, and (2) that summing up the 
prices of UNEs will allow the entrant to pay a smaller amount toward the recovery of the incumbent 
LEC’s shared costs and common costs than would the entrant’s purchase of wholesale service for 
resale. Viewed in those terms, recombination of network elements is a form of arbitrage induced by 
distortions in the regulated pricing of those elements and wholesale services. 
 
Id. at 336. The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court either did not understand this regulatory distortion 
or did not consider it contrary to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See id. at 561-62 (discussing Iowa 
Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 813-14 (8th Cir. 1997)); Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 393-95.)      
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population density, and the like. Bottom-up engineering models can potentially provide 
insights about cost tradeoffs among different inputs and the costs of deploying state-of-
the-art technology when and where it is appropriate to do so. 
Bottom-up models do, however, suffer the s ignificant disadvantage of being 
divorced from actual experience. Consequently, one can never be certain that the 
estimated costs could be achieved by an actual firm, no matter how efficient. Engineering 
cost models (necessarily) simplify the real world, with the result that costs tend to be 
underestimated. The most important simplification is that they fail to account for 
conditions that were relevant at the time the actual investments were made. Rather, model 
results are based on a telecommunications network built under current conditions and 
technology. In actuality, because a telecommunications company provided service in the 
past, it had to configure itself to meet past demand.
51
 Given its past activities, its costs of 
providing service today depend upon this past configuration. The costs are generally 
higher than if facilities were built de novo to meet today’s demand. 
The federal appellate courts have confirmed that the cost models that regulators 
use to set interconnection prices must factor in reality. In July 2000, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the pricing standard that the FCC had used to 
determine what incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) may charge competitive local 
exchange carriers (CLECs) telephone companies for i nterconnection and use of 
unbundled network elements.
52 The Eighth Circuit said that TELRIC pricing was based 
on a hypothetical network that did not permit the ILECs to recover their actual costs.
53
  
The model used by Japan’s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) is a 
bottom-up model that comes with the defects that inhere in such models. In addition, the 
MPT model—like the model developed by the HAI consulting firm and the FCC’s 
Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM)—uses dubious methodology that exacerbates these 
inherent defects. In particular, the MPT model calculates the costs of a network in which 
remote switches are substituted for many host switches in the actual NTT network. 
MPT’s hypothetical network would have lower reliability than NTT’s actual network, 
because multiple routing occurs only after a call reaches a host office. A cable fault 
                                                 
51. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 419-25. 
52. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications, 
Inc. v. FCC, 121 S. Ct. 877 (2001).  
53. 219 F.3d at 750-51.      
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between the remote switch and the host switch (a link where there is not multiple routing) 
leads to disruption of telephone service. Thus, MPT has not estimated the costs of NTT’s 
actual network. Instead, MPT has estimated the cost of a hypothetical network with lower 
reliability. 
Regardless of the merits of any particular cost model, top-down models based on 
actual operating experience provide a more realistically grounded method for estimating 
interconnection costs. Top-down models evaluate plant on a current-cost basis, taking 
account of technological developments that may have diminished the value of existing 
plant. They estimate cost-volume relationships, distinguishing fixed and variable costs, as 
well as service-specific, shared and common costs. They also analyze secular cost trends 
to provide a basis for projecting likely future costs. 
One criticism of top-down modeling is that it may (unless appropriate adjustments 
are made) overestimate the costs of an efficient firm. This bias can occur because top-
down models inherently capture actual experience, including any inefficiencies that 
occurred. 
Some regulators have sought to reconcile the results of bottom-up and top-down 
cost models to get a good grasp on actual cost relationships. A useful example of this 
“hybrid” approach is provided by the United Kingdom. OFTEL, the U.K. telecom-
munications regulator, reconciled BT’s cost estimates based on a top-down model with 
those derived from a bottom-up model developed by an industry-wide working group.
54
 
OFTEL determined that the bottom-up model could understate incremental costs by as 
much as 50 percent.
55
 It now undertakes to reconcile annually the results of the top-down 
and bottom-up models and to develop interconnection rates from a hybrid estimate of 
costs derived from the two models’ estimates. This approach has been widely viewed as a 
success. It provides the means of capturing benefits from both types of modeling 
approaches while providing a check against any systematic biases. 
 
 
                                                 
54. See <http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/1995_98/pricing/ncc1.htm>. 
55. Id.       
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C. The Relationship of Actual Interconnection Prices to the Prices Derived from 
the FCC’s Cost Models 
Actual interconnection prices exceed the levels indicated by the FCC’s cost 
models. One can observe this deviation of an ILEC’s hypothetical costs from its actual 
interconnection price both in the United States and abroad. 
1.  Interconnection Prices in the United States 
Most actual prices for interconnection in the United States substantially exceed 
the FCC’s estimates of incremental costs. These include prices set or approved by the 
FCC, itself, as well as those set by state regulators. The FCC’s cost estimates are based 
on its bottom-up Hybrid Cost Proxy Model, developed to address the issue of universal 
service support to rural areas. The estimates of usage costs in this model are derived from 
the bottom-up cost model developed by the HAI consulting firm for MCI and AT&T. 
The HAI model estimates the costs of interconnection to be between about 0.2 and 0.3 
cents per minute.
56  
In the United States, unlike many foreign countries, there are multiple 
interconnection charges, depending on the type of call being processed, rather than the 
type of interconnection provided. The U.S. approach is inherently defective because it 
invites arbitrage. For this reason, many countries have rejected the U.S. approach. Their 
interconnection charges depend on the interconnection configuration—not the type of 
call. 
  The cheapest interconnection charges in the United States are for local calls. In 
practice, even local interconnection rates are often higher than the FCC’s incremental 
cost estimates. As shown in Table 3, local interconnection rates exceed the FCC’s 





                                                 
56. These estimates were derived by Strategic Policy Research Inc. in a run of the HAI model on data for the 
state of Massachusetts. The host interconnection cost of approximately 0.2 cents per minute reflects the 
HAI model-generated estimate of non-line port end office switching (0.173 cents per minute). The tandem 
interconnection cost of approximately 0.3 cents per minute includes the additional HAI model-generated 
estimates of tandem switching (0.069 cents per minute) and direct transport (0.071 cents per mile per 
minute).       
 




LOCAL INTERCONNECTION RATES, SELECTED STATES, 1999 
 
Note: The host price applies to interconnection at the 
originating or terminating end office. The tandem price 
applies to interconnection at a tandem office and includes 
one mile of transport. Prices do not include charges for 
signaling. 
Source: State regulatory commissions. 
 
A second type of interconnection charge is for origination and completion of 
interstate and international communications. These charges, called interstate “access 
charges,” are set by the FCC, itself. They account for the preponderance of 
interconnection revenues in the United States. As shown in Table 4, below, interstate 
access charges far exceed the FCC’s cost estimates. The implied average mark-up of 
price over cost for interconnection ranges between 180 percent and 430 percent for 
different types of interconnection. 
 
 
Host  Tandem 
Alabama  0.18  0.29 
Arkansas  0.70  0.90 
California  0.09  0.10 
Colorado  0.28  0.52 
Delaware  0.11  0.20 
Georgia  0.18  0.29 
Illinois  0.37  0.50 
Kansas  0.92  1.21 
Louisiana  0.21  0.43 
Maryland  0.33  0.59 
Michigan  0.41  0.70 
Mississippi  0.02  0.03 
New Jersey  0.18  0.37 
New York  0.01  0.02 
Oregon  0.15  0.16 
Pennsylvania  0.19  0.29 
Tennessee  0.19  0.30 
Texas  0.12  0.21 
West Virginia  0.24  0.86 
Compare: HAI  0.20  0.30 
(cents per minute)      
 




INTERSTATE PER-MINUTE ACCESS CHARGES, BY CARRIER 
(CENTS PER MINUTE) 
 
 
A third type of interconnection i  s intrastate switched access, which applies to 
long-distance calls within a single state. While intrastate and interstate access are 
functionally similar services, intrastate access rates are regulated by the state 
commissions that have a wide range of services under their jurisdiction. In some states, 
switched access rates are quite low—comparable to the FCC’s cost estimates. In most 
states, however, the rates far exceed even the high levels of interstate access charges, 
described above. Table 5, below, contains the intrastate access charges for the Bell 
operating company or GTE (now merged into Verizon) for a number of states. Among 
the lowest access fees is that in Illinois, which is approximately $0.005 per minute for 
originating access. Few Bell operating companies in other states offer as low carrier 
access prices. Even Illinois’ low price exceeds the FCC’s range of $0.002 to $0.003 per 
minute. In sharp contrast to Illinois’ price, the price to originate and terminate a call in 









ALLTEL 1.50 1.43 2.93
BellSouth 0.69 0.64 1.33
Cincinnati Bell 0.75 0.71 1.46
Citizens 3.49 2.06 5.55
Global Crossing 1.88 1.14 3.02
Iowa Telecom 2.90 1.06 3.96
Qwest 0.71 0.68 1.39
SBC 0.75 0.71 1.46
Sprint 1.25 0.88 2.13
Verizon 1.10 0.69 1.79
All Price Caps               
(weighted by minutes of use) 0.92 0.71 1.63
NECA (small carriers) 4.20 4.41 8.61
ALL Price Caps and NECA 
(weighted by minutes of use) 1.06 0.85 1.91
Compare: HAI 0.2-0.3 0.2-0.3     
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As we shall explain in the following section, the preponderance of U.S. intrastate 
access charges far exceed NTT’s average interconnection charge in Japan of $0.0151 per 
minute. 
TABLE 5 
INTRASTATE PER-MINUTE ACCESS CHARGES, BY STATE 
(CENTS PER MINUTE) 
 
Note: The total originating and terminating charges are the sum of 
common line, tandem switching, local transport termination, and local 
switching rates.  
In view of these prevailing rates, the FCC’s cost estimates are not at all reflective 
of what competitors actually pay for any kind of interconnection in the United States. 
Actual interconnection prices in the U.S. often exceed NTT’s actual rates in Japan. 
2.   Interconnection Prices Outside the United States 
Interconnection prices in most industrialized countries far exceed the FCC’s cost 
estimates. NTT’s interconnection charges average $0.0151 per minute.
57 They are well 
                                                 
57. In this Article, conversions to U.S. currency are at purchasing power parity (PPP). It is widely 
recognized by economists that PPP provides a better index for international comparisons of real values than 
does the exchange rate. The exchange rate reflects only goods and services that are traded internationally. 









Arizona 3.405 2.420 5.825
Colorado 2.629 4.188 6.817
Florida, BellSouth 2.044 2.811 4.855
Florida, GTE 4.470 5.346 9.816
Illinois 0.502 0.415 0.917
Maine 2.401 1.711 4.112
Massachusetts 0.618 3.506 4.124
New Mexico 5.448 5.448 10.896
Pennsylvania 0.998 0.998 1.997
Texas 1.741 2.934 4.675
Vermont 4.796 4.796 9.593
Washington 1.161 0.169 1.330
Wyoming 6.164 6.164 12.328
Compare: HAI 0.2-0.3 0.2-0.3     
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within the range of interconnection rates established throughout the world. Table 6 shows 
interconnection rates in eighteen industrialized countries.
58 Although NTT’s rates in 
Table 6 are above the median, five of the other countries have higher rates. One might 
reasonably expect NTT’s rates to be toward the upper end of the range because, as we 
explain below, NTT faces high prices for key inputs, especially land and buildings. 
It bears emphasis that interconnection prices in  every country in Table 6 far 
exceed the FCC’s incremental cost estimates, which range from $0.002 to $0.003 per 
minute. Indeed, the minimum interconnection rate is over 2.5 times the upper end of the 
range of the FCC’s estimated costs. As noted above, even U.S. interconnection rates, on 
average, far exceed the FCC’s estimates of incremental costs. 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE INTERCONNECTION PRICES, JANUARY 2001 
(U.S. $ PER MINUTE) 
  Country  Termination  Origination 
1  Austria  0.0131  0.0132 
2  Belgium  0.0144  0.0139 
3  Canada  0.0115  0.0115 
4  Denmark  0.0091  0.0091 
5  Finland  0.0181  0.0175 
6  France  0.0135  0.0128 
7  Germany  0.0092  0.0092 
8  Ireland  0.0100  0.0100 
9  Italy  0.0179  0.0179 
10  Japan  0.0151  0.0151 
11  Netherlands  0.0177  0.0188 
12  New Zealand  0.0268  0.0296 
13  Norway  0.0092  0.0092 
14  Portugal  0.0305  0.0373 
15  Spain  0.0148  0.0148 
16  Sweden  0.0088  0.0089 
17  Switzerland  0.0123  0.0123 
18  United Kingdom  0.0076  0.0081 
Source: Extracted from  BENCHMARK COMPARISON 2001-I (Ovum) at 7, 
11. The exchange rates are the PPP rates presented by Ovum,  id. at 46. 
The rates apply to wireline interconnection for both local and domestic 
long-distance calls. Except for Canada, t he same rates apply for traffic 
originating on mobile networks. 
                                                                                                                                                 
be sold for consumption abroad. The OECD, in particular, typically uses PPP rather than exchange rates to 
make international comparisons of real economic variables. 
58. These rates apply to interconnection rates for local, domestic long-distance, and (in most cases) mobile 
interconnection. They exclude interconnection for international calls.       
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D. The Effect of Input Prices on Interconnection Costs 
Differences in input prices account for much of the difference between 
interconnection prices i n Japan and in the United States or the United Kingdom. The 
costs of supplying telecommunications services, including interconnection, differ across 
countries. One reason for such differences is that carriers in different countries face 
different input prices. This consideration is especially important with respect to 
comparisons between Japan and the United States or United Kingdom  
1.   Land 
Land is a critical input for telecommunications networks, from outside plant to 
switching centers, and business offices. Land values are exceptionally high in Japan 
because of its high population density. Tokyo commercial land prices are almost twice as 
high as those in New York, the most expensive U.S. city. Similarly, London commercial 
land prices are only about 60 percent of commercial land prices in Tokyo.
59 Japanese 
price levels remain high despite decreases in land values over the last ten years.
60  
2.  Construction 
Construction costs also bear directly on the costs of telecommunications 
networks. They are incurred  in building switching centers, constructing conduit, and 
laying distribution lines. The costs of construction in Japan are high vis-à-vis the United 
States and the United Kingdom. For example, U.S. regulatory cost models assume 
construction costs ranging from $833 per square meter to $1,667 per square meter, which 
is consistent with data in the U.S. construction market.
61 In sharp contrast, Japanese 
construction costs in 1997 ranged from $2,025 to $2,147 per square meter for the 
prefecture of Kumamoto (a medium-sized population center in the serving area of NTT 
West). One reason for higher construction costs in Japan is that construction projects 
                                                 
59. JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, WORLD LAND SURVEY OF 1996 (Strategic Policy 
Research analysis of Figure 4, “Land Price of the Most Expensive Commercial Area” of major world 
cities); JAPANESE REAL  ESTATE  INSTITUTE, TOKYO URBAN  LAND PRICE INDEX FOR  COMMERCIAL LAND 
(downloaded May 24, 2001). We deflated Tokyo prices by the index for 2001 and inflated New York and 
London prices by assuming a 3 percent annual inflation to 2001. 
60. “Land Prices in Japan Fell 10th Straight Year,” downloaded from www.indiatimes.com (Mar. 23, 2001). 
61. U.S. Census data indicate construction costs of $936 per square meter. STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES  Table No. 1182 (“Construction Contracts—Value of Construction and Floor Space of 
Building, by Class of Construction: 1980-1996”) (Dept. of Commerce).      
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must meet high earthquake resistance standards that are generally not required in the 
United States except in California.  
3.  Effect on Interconnection Costs 
Higher land and construction prices in Japan translate directly into higher 
investment in land and buildings. In particular, total land and building assets of U.S. 
ILECs at the end of 1999 were approximately $24.3 billion.
62 These assets were largely 
dedicated to switching centers. The value of these assets amounted to approximately 
$138.83 per access line in 1999. In contrast, total land and building assets of NTT East 
and NTT West at the end of the 1999-2000 fiscal year were approximately $11.5 
billion.
63 These assets amounted to $220.03 per access line in 1999.  
Most land and building assets are used in the provision of switching services, 
which are traffic-sensitive rates. It is therefore instructive to examine U.S. ILEC and NTT 
land and building cost differences on a per-minute basis. For this purpose, we have 
employed NTT’s 1999 estimated usage per access line to reflect that Japanese costs 
would be much lower if the costs of land and buildings in Japan were as low as in the 
United States.
64 The value of U.S. ILEC land and building assets amounted to 
approximately $0.0271 per minute of retail traffic, using NTT’s traffic pattern in 1999.
65 
NTT’s land and building assets amounted to approximately $0.04294 per minute of use 
of the NTT network in 1999. 
Comparing these amounts, we see that differences in land and building costs 
alone account for a difference of approximately $0.0158 per minute between the United 
States and Japan, assuming the same (NTT’s) traffic pattern in both countries. This per-
                                                 
62. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 2000 STATISTICS OF COMMON CARRIERS, FOR YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 1999, Table 2.7 at 42, Table 4.10 at 205 [hereinafter 2000 COMMON CARRIER STATISTICS] 
(data reported by all ILECs). 
63.  Data provided by NTT West.
 
64. NTT’s traffic per access line was calculated with data from NTT West and the following reports: 
MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, JAPAN, COMMUNICATIONS IN JAPAN, 2000: E XPANDING 
FRONTIERS: IT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at 45 (2000); MINISTRY OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, HOME AFFAIRS, 
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, O UTLINE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  BUSINESS IN JAPAN, at 14 
(Feb. 2001).  
65. 2000 COMMON CARRIERS STATISTICS, supra note 62, Table 2.7 at 42, Table 4.10 at 205 (data reported 
by all ILECs).      
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minute difference of more than one-and-one half cents amounts to a significant part of 
interconnection costs.
66 
Comparing U.S. ILEC and NTT land and building assets per access line, NTT 
assets are almost twice those of U.S. ILECs for each access line served. This difference 
reflects the United States as a whole, not only New York City, the most expensive city in 
the United States A larger cost difference between the United States as a whole and 
Japan, than between New York and Tokyo, would be expected. 
4.  Other Major Input Cost Differences 
Other input cost differences are also significant. Another major cost difference 
between the United States and Japan is labor cost. Manufacturing wages in Japan are 
about 1.6 times the corresponding U.S. and U.K. wages.
67 Additionally, the cost of laying 
cable is greater in Japan than in the United States In the United States, about half of all 
cable is directly buried, which NTT is not permitted to do. Because of Japan’s high 
population density, direct burial of cable is generally not permitted. It would prevent 
effective use of narrow public rights of way by multiple users, such as providers of 
electric power, water, and sewer services. Further, laying fiber in conduit in Japan is 
subject to stringent repair and repavement requirements. NTT is often required to do 
construction only at night and have the road fully repaved by morning. Laxer 
requirements in the United States lead to lower telecommunications costs but 
considerably more inconvenience for motorists. 
Japan is dependent upon foreign resources for coal and petroleum. Japan’s cost of 
electricity per kilowatt hour is the highest among OECD countries.
68 The most recent 
data available on industrial use prices per kilowatt-hour indicate that Japan’s electricity 
price ($0.143) is almost four times the U.S. price of electricity ($0.039) and over twice 
the British price for electricity ($.064).
69 Among OECD countries, Italy has the next 
highest per-kilowatt hour rate ($0.088), and is about half that of Japan’s.
70 
                                                 
66. Although capital costs are lower in Japan than in the United States, this difference is not enough to offset 
the significant difference in cost between the two countries.  
67. JAPAN LABOR RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMPARISONS. 
68.  ENERGY  INFORMATION  ADMINISTRATION, U.S. D EPARTMENT OF  COMMERCE, J APAN: C OUNTRY 
ANALYSIS BRIEF (as of Apr. 2001). 
69. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ELECTRICITY PRICES FOR 
INDUSTRY: U.S. D OLLARS PER KILOWATT HOUR (data appear to be from third quarter 2000; updated on 
Mar. 15, 2001). Although prices in California have risen significantly due to the electricity shortages in that      
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In short, differences in actual input costs between the United States and Japan should not 
be disregarded. In fact, they explain much of the difference between U.S. and Japanese 
interconnection costs.  
E.  Depreciation in Japanese Cost Models 
In telecommunications-cost modeling, depreciation expense has critical 
importance. It reflects the decline in value of plant and equipment used to supply output. 
That value may decline because of physical wear and/or obsolescence. Regardless, the 
decline in value of plant and equipment is part of the cost of supplying output and should 
be properly reflected in cost modeling. 
In the United States, the FCC and state regulators have set depreciation lives for 
regulated telecommunications carriers. The resulting depreciation expense has not 
sufficed to reflect actual declines in values of assets. (The likely reason for this regulatory 
practice has been to reduce telecommunications prices in the short run, albeit at the cost 
of higher prices and other problems in the future.) Consequently, the large local exchange 
carriers report much lower asset values to their stockholders than are implied by 
inadequate regulatory depreciation in the past. For this reason also, telecommunications 
carriers outside the United States typically depreciate assets much more rapidly than the 
rates allowed by U.S. regulators. U.S. regulatory depreciation expense for the large 
telecommunication holding companies in 1999 was only 7.0 percent of net fixed assets.
71 
In contrast, depreciation expense reported on financial reports of (the companies that are 
now) BellSouth, SBC, Verizon, and Qwest averaged 16.6 percent of net fixed assets in 
1999. Average depreciation expense for incumbent telecommunication operators in the 
European Union and Canada was 17.0 percent of net fixed assets in 1999. U.S. tax 
depreciation also exceeds regulatory depreciation, because it is done on an accelerated 
basis (relative to straight-line depreciation).  
                                                                                                                                                 
state, California Public Utilities Commission information indicates that some industrial customers in that 
state could pay as much as $0.12 per kilowatt hour under the current circumstances. That level is still ¾ of 
the Japanese cost. Additionally, some large California cities are served by municipally owned utilities and 
are unaffected by these rate increases. Furthermore, it is not clear that the average cost of electricity for 
industrial customers across the U.S. would rise near the level experienced in Japan due to the situation in 
one, albeit large, state. Therefore, differences in the cost of electricity remain a reasonable point of 
comparison between the United States and Japan. 
70 U.K. E LECTRICITY A SSOCIATION, PRICES: LATEST   (1999 data, obtained from http:www.electricity.org.uk 
on May 14, 2001).      
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Despite this faster depreciation used in other countries, some prominent U.S. cost 
models—in particular, the HAI and the FCC’s HCPM—use regulatory depreciation lives 
to reflect declines in asset values. As a result, the models substantially underestimate 
actual depreciation cost and do not conform to international practice. 
Depreciation has become an area of controversy with regard to Japanese cost 
models. Table 7 shows depreciation lives used in the NTT Top-Down Model and in the 
model developed by the Cost Study Group, formed under the auspices of the MPT. The 
depreciation rates for copper cable and conduit are the same in the two models. 
Depreciation lives in the NTT Model are shorter for the other categories of assets—
switching, optical cable, buildings for facilities, and buildings for common use. 
Depreciation lives used in the NTT Model are “legal service lives,” as determined by 
Japan’s Ministry of Finance.  These lives are commensurate with NTT’s actual 
experience. 
TABLE 7 
EQUIPMENT CATEGORY SERVICE LIVES IN YEARS 
 
Equipment Category  NTT Top Down 
Model (legal service 
lives) 
Service Lives of 
Study Group, MPT 
Model 
Switching  6  11.9 
Optical Cable  10  11.2 
Copper Cable  13  13 
Conduit  27  27 
Building for Facilities  22.1  33 
Building for 
Common Use 
21.2  37 
 
The predominant switching technology of today’s telecommunications networks 
is circuit switching, which is rapidly becoming obsolete. New technologies—such as soft 
switches and other packet-switching technology (including those that use the Internet 
Protocol, or IP)—are the technology of future communications networks.
72 Just as digital 
switching overtook analog switching technology ten to fifteen years ago, packet 
switching is overtaking circuit-switching technology. AT&T has publicly stated its 
intention to replace its older U.S. circuit-switched network with a packet-based network, 
                                                                                                                                                 
71. See 2000 C OMMON CARRIERS STATISTICS, supra note 62, Table 2.8 (account 6560) and Table 2.7 
(account 260).  
72. See, e.g., Switchcraft, FORBES, Mar. 19, 2001 (from www.forbes.com; downloaded Aug. 24, 2001).      
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even for voice services.
73 The depreciation life for switching equipment in the MPT 
Model, 11.9 years, does not reflect the expected future declines in asset values for a 
technology that is rapidly becoming obsolete. The depreciation life in the NTT Model, 6 
years, is much more reasonable for such a technology. 
Both the NTT and MPT Models rely on a 13-year life for copper equipment. This 
life, though shorter than U.S. depreciation lives, is reasonable because copper is being 
and will continue to be replaced with broadband technology over the next several years. 
Much of embedded copper cable is not suited for Information-Age services, and its useful 
days are nearing an end. A 13-year proposed economic life is quite long under these 
conditions. 
Optical-fiber cable itself is undergoing significant changes. Newer technologies 
such as digital wave division have higher performance, and their prices are rapidly 
declining. Indeed, in March 2001 Lucent introduced its Ultrawave™ family of “next-
generation” optical fiber.
74 These fibers provide significantly more channels for long-
distance communications than single-mode fiber can. Additionally, Corning has upgraded 
its single-mode fiber offerings to include Metro Cor™ fiber, which enables wave division 
multiplexing on larger metropolitan rings with less investment in electronics and laser 
technology.
75 The depreciation life of 11.2 years in the MPT Model is too long to reflect 
declines in asset values under these circumstances. Indeed, the service life of 10 years in 
the NTT Model is conservatively long.  
The NTT Model uses depreciation lives of 38 years for communications buildings 
and 45 years for common buildings. MPT’s depreciation lives for buildings are somewhat 
longer—for example, 45 years for communications buildings. These lives are all well 
within the range of depreciation lives used by U.S. companies. In Japanese accounting, 
however, the aggregate building category also contains many assets that are not 
considered “buildings” in common usage, such as housing for remote terminals. These 
assets have much shorter lives than communications buildings or common buildings. The 
appropriate depreciation life for this aggregate building category is therefore much 
shorter than the appropriate depreciation lives for communications buildings or common 
                                                 
73.  Jason K. Krause, How AT&T Got the Internet, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 9, 1999; Ianna 
Outlines Plan to Evolve the AT&T Network (from www.att.com/technology/ ip/iannaplan.html; 
downloaded Aug. 27, 2001).  
74. Lucent Press Release (Mar. 20, 2001).      
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buildings, considered alone. Evaluated in this light, NTT’s depreciation life of 22.1 years 
for the aggregate building category is reasonable.
76 
In short, the legal service lives, defined by Japan’s Ministry of Finance and used 
by NTT, are grounded in actual experience of Japanese communications carriers. NTT’s 
depreciation lives are reasonable and appropriate given the state of rapid technological 
change. 
F.  Summary and Implications 
The setting of interconnection rates using forward-looking costs models has been 
an intellectually challenging endeavor in the United States, an endeavor that is not yet 
finished, let alone easily transferred to another country with different circumstances. One 
could, of course, argue more generally that the FCC’s implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has simply been wrong because it creates managed 
competition, not real competition. From that perspective, it is too narrow for a regulator 
to focus on the issue of local network access pricing. In other words, the effect of efforts 
to reduce such pricing is to reduce facilities-based competition in the United States or, at 
least, to reduce new investment in facilities. The USTR’s efforts might also have the 
same effect in Japan. Indeed, perhaps the USTR’s goal should be to encourage the 
Japanese to encourage U.S. participation in greater facilities-based competition in Japan. 
For the time being, however, interconnection pricing remains the principal focus of the 
U.S.-Japan negotiations, and so it is critical that the interconnection policy that the USTR 
urges Japan to adopt is one that rests on sound economic analysis. 
Unfortunately, significant shortcomings limit the usefulness of the cost models 
used by the FCC to set interconnection prices, and those cost models motivate the 
USTR’s position with respect to Japan. Actual interconnection prices diverge 
considerably from the estimates of the FCC’s cost models, both within and outside the 
United States. Variations across countries i n the prices of inputs significantly affect 
actual interconnection costs. Moreover, Japanese regulatory policy toward depreciation 
                                                                                                                                                 
75. Move It with Metro Cor™ Fiber (www.corning.com; downloaded Sept. 17, 2001). 
76. The primary difference between this depreciation life and MPT’s is the method of calculating the 
weighted average. The NTT method of calculating the weighted average is correct, in that it yields the 
correct amount of depreciation expense if applied to total plant in the aggregate building category. The 
MPT weighted average does not yield the correct amount of depreciation expense under these 
circumstances.      
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costs is more realistic in light of the rapid technological obsolescence of 
telecommunications assets than is American policy on this subject. These considerations 
underscore the technical sophistication and economic rigor that are necessary when one 
modifies one nation’s interconnection pricing models for use in an entirely different 
nation. We turn now to questions of whether the policies of the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative embody that requisite sophistication and rigor. 
 
IV. Knowledge, Expertise, and Accountability in the Negotiation of Interconnection 
Policy 
 
  Though frequent critics of the FCC’s policies, we find  ourselves in the odd 
position of defending the agency’s institutional competence and the integrity of its 
decision making process. We do so because, on an issue like the pricing methodology for 
unbundled elements of the local telecommunications network, the FCC, for all its warts, 
is the epitome of Frankfurterian administrative perfection when compared with the 
making of foreign telecommunications policy by the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. We consider first the accountability of policy making. We then consider 
the expertise and detailed knowledge required to make policy. 
A.   Accountability 
Two factors contribute to the accountability of policy making on interconnection 
pricing at the FCC. The first is the transparency of the rule making process and the 
related requirement that the FCC explain fully the intellectual basis for its policy 
pronouncements. The second factor is the availability of judicial review of the FCC’s 
decisions, which serves as a check on both the process and substance of the agency’s 
policy making. With respect to both factors, the USTR faces less accountability than does 
the FCC when making telecommunications policy concerning interconnection pricing. 
1.  Transparency 
The FCC is often criticized for being a forum for rent seekers. Although it is hard 
to dispute that the FCC has through the years done much to earn that criticism, the FCC 
at least can claim the virtue of being subject to several basic requirements of transparency 
and accountability. The same cannot be said of the USTR when it undertakes to dictate      
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the telecommunications regulations that other nations must adopt to avoid trade 
sanctions. 
The vast majority of the FCC’s policy initiatives advance through the notice-and-
comment process of the Administrative Procedure Act. With few exceptions, the agency 
does not announce major policy shifts through adjudication.
77
 On any rule making of 
substantial importance, the FCC will publish a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM), 
which may be dozens of pages long. In response, interested parties file detailed 
comments and reply comments, often accompanied by expert affidavits of economists or 
engineers. In a rule making proceeding on a subject as complex as the pricing of local 
interconnection, such filings collectively would run  into the thousands, if not tens of 
thousands, of pages. 
   Equipped with a voluminous public record, the FCC’s staff then writes for the 
Commission a “report and order” that may run a hundred pages or more. (The First 
Report and Order on interconnection pricing exceeded 600 pages in length.) The report 
and order carefully footnotes arguments and factual propositions raised or challenged by 
commenters. To be sure, the FCC on occasion mischaracterizes a legitimate argument 
that it finds inconvenient and then knocks down its own straw-man rendition of the 
argument—or, to mix metaphors, it may simply sweep the argument under the rug and 
decline to address it in the report and order.
78
 But these tendencies are constrained, at 
least in principle, by the availability of judicial review, about which we will say more 
presently. Parties interested in the proposed rule making may make ex parte presentations 
to commissioners or staff (except in the week-long “sunshine period” immediately 
preceding a Commission vote on the particular item in question), but such meetings must 
be publicly disclosed and the party making the presentation must lodge a brief summary 
of it with the secretary of the FCC for public inspection.
79
 When the FCC announces its 
                                                 
77. One notable and controversial exception was the FCC’s abolition of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987. See 
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987), recons. denied, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 2035 (1988), aff’d sub 
nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
78. For example, the FCC badly mischaracterized the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR) in its First 
Report and Order on local interconnection and then rejected the use of the straw-man rule that it 
erroneously called the ECPR. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 9, at 344-45, 351-79. Subsequently, in 
Iowa Utilities Board, Justice Breyer criticized the FCC on this score. With respect to the “the FCC’s 
decision to prohibit use” of the ECPR, 525 U.S. at 878, he noted: “The FCC rejected that [ECPR] system, 
but in doing so it did not claim, nor did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of such a system would 
be arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. 
79. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1201 et seq.      
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new policy through the promulgation of a rule, it publishes its report and order 
electronically on its website and subsequently in hard copy in the FCC Record, which 
routinely exceeds 10,000 pages in length each year. 
  In contrast, the process and substance of the USTR’s decision making on 
interconnection pricing are far less transparent. The USTR’s annual request for comments 
on compliance with telecommunications trade agreements runs only three pages in the 
Federal Register.
80
 The public comments that the USTR solicits may be read only by 
appointment in the USTR public reading room during a 5½-hour period on business 
days.
81
 Ex parte presentations to the USTR are not subject to the disclosure requirements 
that apply at the FCC. The outcome of the USTR’s deliberations are not recorded in a 
public report evaluating those comments and announcing policy decisions based on such 
an evaluation.  
2.   Judicial Review 
  The USTR’s policy decisions on interconnection pricing are less accountable than 
those of the FCC because the federal appellate courts are less likely to engage in judicial 
review of the USTR’s decisions than the FCC’s decisions. 
  Notwithstanding their obligation to defer to agency interpretations of law under 
the Chevron doctrine,
82
 the U.S. Courts of Appeals reverse the FCC’s most portentous 
rule makings with regularity. In one case, the D.C. Circuit said that the FCC had “done a 
remarkable job of rebutting the presumption of its own expertise.”
83
 In particular, the 
FCC’s First Report and Order on interconnection pricing has gone to the Supreme Court 
twice between 1998 and 2001, most recently after the Eighth Circuit struck down the 
agency’s TELRIC pricing model. Regardless of whether the these federal appellate courts 
affirm or vacate specific features of the FCC’s policies on interconnection, the fact 
remains that the courts scrutinize those policies with a high degree of rigor and 
skepticism.   Moreover, a number of federal appellate judges were scholars on the 
application of economics to regulatory issues before their appointments t o the bench. 
Such jurists bring economic sophistication to the usual judicial review of FCC rule 
                                                 
80.  See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Request for Comments Concerning 
Compliance with Telecommunications Trade Agreements, 66 FED. REG. 1715 (Jan. 9, 2001). 
81. See id. at 1717. 
82. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).      
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making. They hold the FCC to high intellectual and procedural standards, and much 
effort at the FCC is devoted to bulletproofing an agency decision for the inevitable phase 
of appellate litigation.  
Judicial review of the USTR’s decisions is quite a different matter. The D.C. 
Circuit, in a decision by Judge Stephen Williams, has left little doubt that the chances of 
securing judicial review of a decision by the Trade Representative are vanishingly small. 
In 1992, Public Citizen, the Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth sued the Trade 
Representative and the President, claiming that they had failed to prepare, under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
84
 e nvironmental impact statements 
concerning the USTR’s then-current negotiations regarding the North America Free 
Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In Public Citizen v. Office of the 
United States Trade Representatives,  the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 
interest groups’ complaint on the ground that they had “failed to identify any ‘final 
agency action’ judicially reviewable within the meaning of § 10(c) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”
85
 The district court had dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, an 
issue that the D.C. Circuit did not address.
86
 The Trade Representative made an array of 
additional defenses based on lack of jurisdiction, lack of ripeness, preemption of NEPA 
by federal trade legislation, and constitutional grounds, as well as on the ground that 
USTR was not an “agency” subject to NEPA.
87
  
So much resistance from both USTR and the courts to judicial review on 
jurisdictional, justiciability, and constitutional grounds does not bode well for the rare 
plaintiff who could successfully run the gauntlet to have his complaint reviewed on the 
merits. And, if the Trade Representative’s failure to file an environmental impact 
statement does not constitute a final agency action for purposes of APA review 
(assuming arguendo that NEPA applies to USTR), then it would also seem likely that a 
final agency action could not be found in the USTR’s failure to consider substantive 
economic arguments about the shortcomings of TELRIC pricing when formulating U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
83. ALLTEL Corp. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 551, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Bork, J.). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). 
85. 970 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Williams, J.) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704). 
86. Id. (citing Public Citizen v. USTR , 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992)). 
87. Id. at 918.      
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international trade policy with respect to Japan’s telecommunications sector. This 
absence of effective judicial review raises the specter that the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative might increasingly become the locus of decision making on complex 
matters of regulatory policy precisely because its relative insulation from judicial review 
permits the USTR to decide those matters arbitrarily. 
One can certainly argue that a department within the Executive Branch should not 
be subject to the same requirements for transparency and judicial review as an 
independent administrative agency. If the USTR is not subject to transparency and 
judicial review, however, there are clear disadvantages to its making policy in an area of 
economic activity where transparency and judicial review are especially beneficial. 
Telecommunications policy—whether for the United States or, through implicit threats of 
trade sanctions, for foreign countries—is such an area of economic policy making, in no 
small part because of the expertise and detailed knowledge required to make responsible 
decisions, the consideration to which we now turn.  
B.  Expertise and Detailed Knowledge 
Two separate lines of argument lead to the same conclusion that the USTR lacks 
the expertise and detailed knowledge required to make policy on interconnection pricing. 
That the two lines of argument produce the same answer is significant, because they build 
from quite different—perhaps mutually inconsistent—beliefs about the proper role of 
politics in the decisions of an independent regulatory agency like the FCC. Reasonable 
minds (including those of coauthors) can differ on which set of beliefs is preferable. But 
one need not resolve that difference of opinions to see that serious problems result when, 
lacking the requisite expertise and detailed knowledge, the USTR makes policy on a 
subject as complex as interconnection pricing. 
1.  Independent Regulatory Organizations 
An important provision of the WTO agreement on telecommunications services is 
the commitment to have independent regulatory organizations carry out 
telecommunications regulation.
88
 One widely held belief is that it is efficacious to have 
                                                 
88. The WTO’s Reference Paper provides: “The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, 
any supplier of basic telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators 
shall be impartial with respect to all market participants.” Reference Paper, supra note 20, at ¶ 5.      
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appropriately designed independent organizations perform this regulatory function. Such 
an organization is thought to be the institution best able to acquire and retain the detailed 
knowledge and expertise necessary for effective telecommunications regulation. It is 
insulated to some extent from political pressures. It therefore has some ability to carry out 
policies based on expert analysis, without getting bogged down in day-to-day politics. 
From this perspective, it is ironic that the USTR’s actions in the U.S.-Japan 
negotiations on interconnection pricing, which  ostensibly are intended to promote the 
WTO agreement on telecommunications services, have undermined the critical provision 
of that agreement concerning independent regulatory organizations. The essence of the 
USTR’s exporting of U.S. telecommunications policies is to wrest decision-making 
power from foreign regulators to the USTR itself. But the USTR does not have the 
detailed knowledge of telecommunications and expertise that the foreign regulatory 
organization can be expected to have. It also may lack detailed knowledge of the country 
into which the U.S. policies are to be imported. 
What the USTR does have, by virtue of its being part of the Executive Branch, is 
susceptibility to political pressures. The USTR’s policies therefore inevitably politicize 
tel ecommunications regulation in the foreign country. The interconnection policies of 
Japan thus are molded to satisfy American political purposes rather than the informed 
judgments of an independent regulatory authority in Japan which, consistent with 
princi ples of the WTO agreement and its associated Reference Paper, would otherwise 
base its decisions on expertise and detailed knowledge concerning the industry it 
regulates. 
2.  Political Change and Deference 
  An alternative set of beliefs would accept as given the susceptibility of the USTR to 
political influence and, indeed, regard that susceptibility to be a useful policy instrument 
that is legitimately subject to redirection following electoral change. From this perspective, 
the relevant questions are whether the USTR is sufficiently nimble in responding to 
electoral change, and whether the USTR, because it lacks expertise and detailed 
knowledge, improperly defers, to parties outside the political scope of the Executive 
Branch (whether at independent agenci es or in the private sector), too much when shaping 
the international trade policy of the United States.       
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  To persons holding such beliefs, the U.S.-Japan interconnection negotiation exhibits 
an improbable tail-wags-dog quality. The President is empowered to negotiate U.S. trade 
policy. For advice, he delegates under statute certain powers to the Trade Representative, a 
cabinet level official whose appointment the Senate must confirm. The Trade 
Representative in turn delegates this policy formulation to his subordinates, only some of 
whom are Senate-confirmed appointees. For advice, the USTR staff defers to the FCC’s 
International Bureau, created in 1997, whose work is often considered abstruse even 
among persons who are conversant about domestic telecommunications regulation. 
Because of that abstruseness, the International Bureau may have a lighter degree of 
oversight from the FCC’s chairman and commissioners than does the Common Carrier 
Bureau, where domestic interconnection policy is made. 
  Electoral change makes this sequence of delegation and deference more 
problematic. Although the 2000 election resulted in the Republicans taking control of the 
White House, and thus control of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the 
telecommunications negotiations that the USTR was pursuing with Japan by the end of 
2001 were predicated on the policies promulgated five years earlier by an FCC chairman, 
Reed Hundt, who was closely associated with the previous Democratic administration. 
Certainly, some informed observers regard Chairman Hundt and his First Report and 
Order on interconnection pricing as controversial—not simply as a matter of substantive 
telecommunications policy, but politically as well in the sense of using agency action to 
advance interpretations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that did not accord with 
the statute that Congress had recently enacted.
89 This concern about overreaching 
behavior by the FCC was compounded when Chairman Hundt announced his view in 
1997 that the signatory nations to the WTO agreement on telecommunications services 
had obliged themselves to copy the same TELRIC pricing methodology, promulgated by 
the FCC in August 1996, which has since caused much controversy and litigation in the 
United States.  
                                                 
89. See REED E. H UNDT, Y OU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION: A S TUDY OF INFORMATION AGE POLITICS 
(Yale Univ. Press 2000). Mr. Hundt writes: “The conference committee compromises [for the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996] had produced a mountain of ambiguity that was generally tilted toward the 
local phone companies’ advantage. But under principles of statutory construction, we had broad discretion in 
writing the implementing regulations. Indeed like the modern engineers trying to straighten the Leaning 
Tower of Pisa, we could aspire to provide the new entrants to the local telephone markets a fairer chance to 
compete than they might find in any explicit provision of the law.” Id. at 154. See also Glen O. Robinson, 
Reed Hundt, Revolutionary Manqué, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 197 (2001) (critical review of HUNDT, supra).      
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  By design, a bureaucracy like the FCC or the USTR remains in motion in the 
same direction unless acted upon by the external force of political change. In other words, 
a bureaucracy has inertia. It is not realistic to expect that bureaucrats will redirect their 
agency until told to do so. Conversely, a political actor charged with leading a 
bureaucracy cannot expect it to change directions until that actor recognizes that the 
bureaucracy is off course and exercises the leadership required to point it toward a 
different destination. Consequently, it is incumbent upon a new FCC chairman and a new 
Trade Representative to take a fresh look at the policies that they have inherited from 
their predecessors, thereby to ensure that those policies accord with the larger political 
objectives of the administration that appointed them. If the FCC chairman and the Trade 
Representative fail to do so, they may unwittingly find themselves being dragged along 
by the bureaucracy’s faithful execution of a policy that deserves to be changed. 
  These considerations of bureaucratic inertia and electoral change have special 
relevance to the U.S.-Japan negotiations on interconnection pricing. By the fall of 2001, the 
new Trade Representative was evidently unaware that his staff, by continuing to pursue 
faithfully the policies of his predecessor, had unwittingly sent the new Trade 
Representative out to skate on thin ice. In October 2001, the Supreme Court heard oral 
argument in a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had struck 
down the FCC’s TELRIC model for setting interconnection rates. The USTR, in exporting 
U.S. telecommunications policies to Japan, seems unaware of how controversial those 
policies are in the United States. If the Supreme Court affirms the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
in whole or part, the Trade Representative will be left in the humiliating position of 
explaining to the Japanese government why it should adopt the same specific pricing model 
for interconnection that the Supreme Court of the United States has found to be an unlawful 
interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Even if the Supreme Court reverses, 
and vindicates the FCC’s version of TELRIC pricing, one must ask whether risking such 
international humiliation is the most prudent way for the USTR to conduct its negotiations 
with Japan.  
Not all responsibility for averting this possible embarrassment for the United 
States in the U.S.-Japan interconnection negotiations rests with the Trade Representative, 
however. Because of his expertise and detailed knowledge on telecommunications, and 
because of his understanding of the larger policy objectives of the President who      
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appointed him, Chairman Powell of the FCC is uniquely able to warn the Trade 
Representative of the risk in the U.S.-Japan negotiations while the Supreme Court is 
deciding a case on the FCC’s TELRIC pricing policies. Neither the Trade Representative 
nor his staff can replicate that expertise internally. To anyone who has seriously studied 
the complexities of access pricing and network unbundling in telecommunications, it is 
preposterous to think that the Trade Representative and his tiny staff could sufficiently 
digest this subject to be equipped as an institution to tell another nation how to write its 
domestic telecommunications regulations.
90 Even the brief overview in Part II of the 
complexities inherent in TELRIC cost models demonstrates why that is so.  
Why, therefore, should anyone expect that the USTR would begin to immerse 
itself in the analytical subtleties of interconnection pricing? That is not its comparative 
advantage or its mandate. The job of the USTR is to negotiate trade deals. For the USTR, 
the attainment of an agreement is a goal unto itself, without regard to the demonstrable 
economic effects of the agreement on consumer or producer welfare in another nation. It 
is not the USTR’s job to make substantive regulatory policy for domestic application in 
the United States. Nor should it be the USTR’s job to coerce foreign governments to 
adopt domestic policies that the USTR regards  as beneficial to U.S. exporters. In 
responding to such coercion, the foreign government would know full well that the USTR 
did not understand the consequences (for the foreign country) of those domestic 
policies—especially in an area as complex as telecommunications policy. The foreign 
government might also reasonably conclude that the USTR did not care about those 
consequences. The best outcome that could be hoped for under these circumstances is 
that the USTR would use up an excessive amount of bargaining leverage (that could be 
more effectively used elsewhere) for modest trade gains. More likely, the whole process 
would be counterproductive. 
In short, it is not the prerogative of bureaucrats at the USTR to abandon 
unilaterally a preexisting policy of trade negotiation. We should not be surprised that they 
do not do so. Nor can bureaucrats at the FCC be expected to reverse course unilaterally 
and advise the USTR to abandon the approach to interconnection pricing that has been 
the foundation for the U.S.-Japan negotiations. Rather, it is the responsibility of the 
                                                 
90. For excellent surveys of the economic subtleties of this subject, see JEAN-JACQUES  LAFFONT & JEAN 
TIROLE, C OMPETITION IN  TELECOMMUNICATIONS (MIT Press 2000); Mark Armstrong,  The Theory of      
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chairman of the FCC to inform the Trade Representative when it is necessary or desirable 
to take a fresh look at the current trade policy. A fresh look may be justified in a number 
of circumstances—when a relevant Supreme Court decision is pending, when economic 
research calls into question the efficacy of an existing policy, or when an election brings 
to power new leaders whose policy directions differ in pertinent respects from those of 
their predecessors. All three of these considerations are present in the case of the U.S.-
Japan negotiations on interconnection pricing. 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The World Trade Organization WTO (and the Office of U.S. Trade 
Representative within the WTO structure) have a legitimate mission to break down 
barriers to market access. That mission increasingly gets the WTO into the business of 
judging whether domestic regulation creates such barriers to foreign entrants. At the 
present time, however, there is no bright line between what is a legitimate concern of the 
WTO (or, perhaps more accurately stated, of WTO members when examining the 
regulatory practices of other WTO members) and what is overreaching behavior by a 
given nation that possesses special influence over its trading partners. In this Article, we 
have addressed a case that is not a close call, but rather is a clear case of overreach. 
It is presumptuous, if not also demonstrably false, for the United States 
government to assert that the 1997 WTO agreement on telecommunications services 
codified the policies of the Federal Communications Commission on interconnection 
pricing under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Trade Representative should not 
compound that presumptuousness by threatening to seek trade sanctions before the WTO 
if another nation will not ape the FCC when promulgating domestic policy on the 
regulated pricing of mandatory competitor access to the network and unbundled elements 
of that nation’s incumbent telecommunications carrier. American policy in this area has 
not yet proven itself worthy of emulation. 
A long with humility, American trade negotiators need the detailed knowledge 
and expertise to understand why it may be foolish and harmful to impose a particular 
FCC cost model on another country. It is far from clear that the USTR currently 
                                                                                                                                                 
Access Pricing and Interconnection, in HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS (Martin Cave, 
Sumit Majumdar & Ingo Vogelsang, eds., North-Holland, forthcoming 2002).      
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possesses that detailed knowledge and experience. But it is clear that the time is long 
overdue for the President and the Trade Representative, aided by the advice of the FCC 
chairman, to examine whether U.S. trade policy in this area has gone seriously awry. 
 
 